Democratization and the Diffusion of Shari'a Law: Comparative Insights from Indonesia by Buehler, Michael & Muhtada, Dani
1/38 
 
This	  is	  the	  Accepted	  Version	  of	  the	  below	  article	  which	  will	  be	  published	  by	  Sage	  and	  made	  available	  
at:	  https://uk.sagepub.com/en-­‐gb/eur/south-­‐east-­‐asia-­‐research/journal202561	  	  
	  
Accepted	  Version	  of	  Article	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22317/	  	  
 
Michael Buehler and Dani Muhtada. “Democratization and the Diffusion of Shari’a Law: 
Comparative Insights from Indonesia” Southeast Asia Research 24, 2 (2016) 
 
  
2/38 
 
Democratization and the Diffusion of Shari’a Law: Comparative Insights from Indonesia 
Michael Buehler and Dani Muhtada1 
Abstract  
The democratization of politics has been accompanied by a rise of Islamic laws in many 
Muslim-majority countries. Despite a growing interest in the phenomenon, the Islamization of 
politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries is rarely understood as a process that 
unfolds across space and time. Based on an original dataset established during years of field 
research in Indonesia, this paper analyzes the spread of shari’a regulations across the world’s 
largest Muslim-majority democracy since 1998. The paper shows that shari’a regulations in 
Indonesia diffused unevenly across space and time. Explanations put forward in the literature on 
the diffusion of morality policies in other countries such as geographic proximity, institutions, 
intergovernmental relations and economic conditions did not explain the patterns in the diffusion 
of shari’a regulations in Indonesia well. Instead, shari’a regulations in Indonesia were most 
likely to spread across jurisdictions where local Islamist groups situated outside the party system 
had an established presence. In short, the Islamization of politics was highly contingent on local 
conditions. Future research will need to pay more attention to local Islamist activists and 
networks situated outside formal politics as potential causes for the diffusion of shari’a law in 
democratizing Muslim-majority countries. 
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Introduction 
As a result of the democratization of politics in many parts of the Muslim world, “elected 
governments face growing pressure to expand or preserve Islamic law” (Kendhammer, 2013, p. 
291). Consequently, the democratization of politics has been accompanied by the spread of 
Islamic law in many Muslim-majority countries (Riaz, 1985, pp. 41-7; Kendhammer, 2013, p. 
291; Villalon, 1994, p. 434; Yavuz, 1997, p. 63). 
Most of the existing literature focuses on the consequences the adoption of Islamic laws, 
including human rights, the treatment of women and religious minorities, as well as state-religion 
relations more broadly. In recent years, a smaller literature has emerged that examines the causes 
behind the adoption of Islamic law in the context of democratization.2 This article engages with 
the latter literature as we think it suffers from several shortcomings. Most important, the 
Islamization of politics implies a process that unfolds over time and across a democratizing 
country’s territory. However, despite a growing interest in the causes behind the Islamization of 
politics in the context of democratization, current scholarship neither understands the spread of 
shari’a law as a dynamic phenomenon nor does it explicitly address temporal and spatial issues. 
Most existing studies only show that the democratization of politics in Muslim-majority 
countries is often followed by an Islamization of politics. 
Yet, studying the Islamization of politics’ temporal and spatial dimension is important for 
several reasons. Democratization is not unfolding in a unilinear fashion. Rather, it is a protracted 
process with frequent rollbacks and without a predefined outcome (Carothers, 2002, pp. 5-21.) 
Since the Islamization of politics seems tied to the democratization of politics, it is highly likely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Kendhammer 2013 for an overview. 
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that the Islamization of politics is an irregular process too. It is therefore crucial to understand 
what facilitates and obstructs the Islamization of politics over time. 
It is important to also study the spatial dimension of the Islamization of politics for 
several reasons. Democratization is an uneven process even within nation-states as the growing 
literature on subnational authoritarianism shows (Gibson, 2005; Sidel, 2014). Furthermore, 
democratic transitions are often accompanied by a decentralization of political authority. This 
has created multi-level democratic systems with complex power dynamics across government 
layers, including many Muslim-majority countries (Riaz, 1985; Villalon, 1994; Yavuz, 1997). 
In short, existing studies do not account for the possibility that the adoption of Islamic 
law may occur gradually over time and unevenly across a democratizing country’s territory. As 
the political landscape and institutional context in Muslim-majority countries become more 
hetereogenous as a result of democratization and decentralization, an explicit focus on the spread 
of Islamic law across time and space will therefore provide a more nuanced understanding of the 
Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries.  
The spread of shari’a regulations in Indonesia 
To begin isolating factors that potentially facilitate or obstruct the spread of Islamic law 
across time and space in the context of democratization in Muslim-majority countries, we 
examined the adoption of shari’a regulations in Indonesia.  
The collapse of the authoritarian New Order regime in 1998 abolished restrictions on 
party formation that Suharto had imposed during his reign. Now parties could be established 
freely, including parties with a religious platform. In addition, executive and legislative elections 
at both the national and local level were introduced. Finally, the national government 
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decentralized political and fiscal authority to the subnational level. These reforms turned 
Indonesia not only into the largest Muslim-majority democracy but also into one of the most 
decentralized countries in the world.      
While the national government theoretically retained authority over religious affairs 
under the decentralization laws adopted in 1998, it also provided local governments with the 
authority to amend national laws through local regulations.  
Provincial and district governments have used their new powers to adopt local regulations 
on a variety of moral and religious issues (Buehler 2106; 2013; Bush, 2008; Lindsey, 2008).3 For 
example, some of these local regulations prohibit alcohol consumption, gambling and 
prostitution. Others regulate the collection of religious alms, Qur’an reading education and 
female dress codes.4 Most scholars agree that the adoption of these shari’a regulations “clearly 
represents a historical breakthrough in the trajectory of political Islam in Indonesia” (Hasan, 
2007, p. 10). 
While sensationalist accounts claimed that the more participatory political environment 
after 1998 had triggered a widespread “Islamization of politics” and a “creeping shari’a-ization” 
of the archipelago (Anwar 2003), more nuanced assessments suggest considerable temporal and 
spatial variation in the adoption of these shari’a regulations. With regard to the temporal 
dimension, most scholars have argued that the spread of these shari’a regulations is linked to 
Indonesia’s turbulent transition period. Concretely, shari’a regulations were adopted in the 
context of political instability, the breakdown of law and order and as a result of new players 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Districts (kabupaten) and municipalities (kota) are situated below provinces in Indonesia’s administrative 
hierarchy. For brevity’s sake, we only refer to districts unless there are developments distinct to municipalities.   
4 For a more exhaustive list of these regulations, see Pisani and Buehler, unpublished manuscript. 
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entering politics who were eager to carve out a profile for themselves in a newly democratic 
political arena after 32 years of military rule (Eddyono, 2011; Hakimul, 2011; Hefner, 2011; Van 
Bruinessen, 2013). Several scholars claimed that the adoption of shari’a regulations slowed 
down as Indonesia’s democracy became more consolidated (Bush, 2008; Makruf and 
Halimatussa’diyah, 2014). In short, the adoption of shari’a regulations in Indonesia varied across 
time. Shari’a regulations were adopted in rapid succession immediately after the collapse of the 
New Order regime in 1998 but such incidents became rare as Indonesia’s transition matured. 
With regard to territorial variance in the adoption of shari’a regulations, several studies 
showed that these regulations cluster in a small number of jurisdictions (Buehler, 2013; Bush, 
2008). Concretely, 62 percent of all shari’a regulations that have been adopted since 1998 cluster 
in only six provinces. To provide another figure that shows the highly uneven adoption of these 
regulations across space, 60 percent of all shari’a regulations are concentrated in only 23 percent 
(115/ 497) of all Indonesian districts (Pisani and Buehler, unpublished manuscript). 
While the Islamization of politics in Indonesia after 1998 seems to be characterized by 
considerable temporal and spatial variance, none of the existing studies offer concrete insights 
into the factors that potentially facilitate or obstruct the spread of shari’a regulations across time 
and space. To better understand the temporal and spatial distribution of these shari’a regulations 
in Indonesia after 1998, a more explicit focus on the conditions that potentially facilitate or 
obstruct the spread of such shari’a regulations is necessary. In other words, most of the existing 
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literature focuses on the ‘who’ of Islamist politics, whereas the contribution of this article lies in 
its disaggregation and comparative analysis of the “what”, “where”, and “when.”5  
Situating the diffusion of shari’a regulations in the theoretical literature 
In this context, it is important to note that we are not interested in examining the adoption 
of shari’a regulations but the diffusion of such regulations across time and space. “Diffusion” 
denotes the movement of a policy or a law from one jurisdiction to another. “Adoption” means 
the enactment of a policy or a law in a specific jurisdiction (Karch, 2007, p. 56). In short, we 
study the interdependence between subnational polities with regard to the adoption of shari’a 
regulations to gain a better understanding of the conditions under which such regulations have 
spread in the context of democratization in Indonesia after 1998.  
Hypotheses on the diffusion of morality policies 
The literature on comparative public policymaking in general and the extensive literature 
on the diffusion of morality policies across the United States of America (USA) in particular 
provided a starting point for our own research (Mooney, 2000, p. 174; Graham et al., 2013).  
Scholarship on the diffusion of morality policies across the USA has put forward 
competing explanations for the spread of such regulations. One of the earliest hypotheses 
claimed that geographic proximity facilitates the diffusion of morality policies. Polities that share 
boundaries with one another adopt similar policies because information flows easily between 
jurisdictions in close vicinity to one another. Furthermore, jurisdictions close to one another also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We are not explicitly addressing “how“ shari’a regulations diffuse. Instead, we try to isolate broad patterns in the 
diffusion of shari’a regulations that may become the starting point for a more detailed analysis of the mechanisms 
and processes through which shari’a regulations diffuse. Subsequent research will have to identify the actual 
mechanisms and processes through which Islamic law spreads in the context of democratization in Indonesia and 
other democratizing Muslim-majority countries. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for encouraging us to be 
clearer on this point.  
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often face similar political challenges and therefore adopt similar policies. Finally, jurisdictions 
sharing borders often adopt the same policies to prevent spill-over effects. For example, 
prostitutes (and their clients) may travel from jurisdictions that adopted harsh regulations against 
the sex industry to jurisdictions with a less punitive legal environment. To prevent this, 
jurisdictions adjacent to early-adopters may follow suit and adopt similar policies.6   
Another set of studies from the USA argues that the institutional context determines the 
diffusion of morality policies. This literature’s main argument is that there are reformed and 
nonreformed jurisdictions. Reformed jurisdictions are districts that are ruled by district managers 
rather than district heads. Such managers are appointed by local parliaments based on 
professional management credentials. In nonreformed jurisdictions, district heads are directly 
elected by the people. Furthermore, local parliaments in reformed jurisdictions are elected based 
on a proportional or “at large”-electoral system, rather than from single-member districts. The 
latter, ward-based elections are characteristic of unreformed jurisdictions (Sharp, 2005, p. 16).  
How do these institutional differences matter for the diffusion of morality policies? In 
reformed jurisdictions, both executive governments and parliaments are somewhat isolated from 
public pressures. In nonreformed jurisdictions, in contrast, it is easier for popular demands to 
influence policymaking. In other words, the institutional framework lends itself to politicization 
given the presence of direct elections for executive government posts and ward-based elections 
for local parliamentarians. Politicians in such jurisdictions are vulnerable to machine politics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A similar logic is said to have led to a “race to the bottom” in many American states with regard to social welfare 
policies. Fearful of attracting social welfare recipients from jurisdictions with lower quality social welfare regimes, 
many jurisdistinctions have cut back on social welfare provisions. In fact, US-states have often pro-actively pushed 
citizens considered a burden to local welfare systems across state borders. The infamous “Greyhound therapy” in 
Nevada is just one example. There, in an attempt to reduce health costs, mental health clinics were emptied in 2014 
by sitting patients on an interstate Greyhound bus to California in the hope that the health system there would pick 
them up. Many of these patients became homeless in California instead. See Rather 2014. 
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based on clientelist relations, which works in favor of small but well-organized special interests, 
including conservative pressure groups.   
 Related to the literature that emphasizes the importance of institutions for the diffusion of 
morality policies are arguments that focus on intergovernmental relations as drivers of diffusion 
processes.  Local jurisdictions are embedded in a complex institutional hierarchy. Hence, policy 
decisions at the subnational level are not made in isolation but often depend on rules and 
regulations issued by higher-level administrative layers. For example, if provinces (or states in 
the case of the USA) outlaw the possession of drug paraphernalia, it is challenging for districts 
located in such provinces to adopt policies on needle exchange programmes for drug addicts. In 
other words, morality policies against needle exchange programmes are more likely to spread to 
jurisdictions that are located in provinces which do not outlaw the possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  
 Furthermore, there are theories about the diffusion of morality policies that assign causal 
primacy to economic factors. For instance, morality policies against gambling are less likely to 
be adopted in jurisdictions that are in financial distress. There, economic pressures trump 
morality considerations. In prosperous communities, economic considerations are less likely to 
override morality concerns.     
Finally, another strand of literature argues that local cultures define the diffusion of 
morality policies. Local policymakers are a product of the local culture they are embedded in. 
They are reflective of local values either because they have been socialized in the local 
communities whose politics they now shape or because they want to get re-elected and therefore 
adjust to the moral universe of their local communities. Morality policies are more likely to 
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diffuse across jurisdictions with conservative local cultures than across jurisdictions with 
progressive local cultures.7   
Studying diffusion through comparing policy content 
Most studies on the diffusion of policies focus on potential actors spreading a particular 
policy from one jurisdiction to another. However, such research is often conducted in 
consolidated democracies where the policymaking process is relatively well understood.  
We considered it a more prudent approach to first isolate broad patterns in the spread of 
shari’a regulations by comparing the content of shari’a regulations across time and space. Such 
an approach has several advantages: Studying the diffusion of policies through a comparative 
content analysis is neglected in the existing literature (Graham et al., 2013, p.17; Karch, 2007, p. 
55). This often limits the insights into diffusion processes because studies that focus on actors 
rather than policy content often treat the spread of regulations as a process with a dichotomous 
outcome. Actors either adopt or do not adopt a specific policy in their respective jurisdiction. 
However, the diffusion process may be more nuanced. For instance, a jurisdiction may adopt a 
more stringent or more lenient version of a policy that already exists in another jurisdiction 
rather than just adopt or not adopt a policy. For democratizing Muslim-majority countries, this 
raises the question whether jurisdictions that adopt shari’a regulations relatively early in the 
democratization process adopt more comprehensive and harsher shari’a regulations than 
jurisdictions that are relative latecomers. In other words, is there a radicalization in the 
Islamization of politics over time or does the Islamization of politics peter out as democratization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 There has been a long debate in political science on how to conceptualize culture. Numerous scholars have tried to 
identify local cultures across the USA, with varying degrees of success. For instance, Rosdil differentiates between 
conventional and unconventional jurisdictions in US-local politics based on research that examines women’s social 
roles, the prevalence of tertiary education, the number of non-traditional households, including unrelated individuals 
living together, female-headed families and the prevalence of service-related employment in the local economy. 
Rosdil then argues that morality policies are more likely to spread across jurisdictions with conservative local 
cultures than jurisdictions with progressive local cultures. See Rosdil 1991. 
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progresses? If there is no evolution in the content of shari’a regulations as they spread, does this 
indicate that the Islamization of politics is merely symbolic?  
In short, tracking the diffusion of shari’a regulations through a comparison of their 
content provides insights into the scope of the Islamization process in the context of 
democratization that analyses with a focus on actors cannot provide.  
We also compared the content of shari’a regulations because such content is relatively 
accessible compared to actors such as the local bureaucracies or Islamist networks through which 
the diffusion of shari’a regulations may occur. 
We will elaborate briefly on the role of actors in the dissemination of shari’a regulations 
at the end of this paper but want to focus on the role of actors mainly in future research and after 
the broad patterns in the diffusion of shari’a regulations are better understood. 
The diffusion of shari’a regulations across Indonesia since 1998 
To establish a dataset of shari’a regulations, we relied on the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MoHA), which, theoretically, has to keep tabs on all local regulations. To verify and complete 
the data obtained from the MoHA, we checked the website of every jurisdiction in Indonesia. 
Many jurisdictions publish online the local regulations they adopt. We also utilized existing 
compilations of shari’a regulations collected by watchdog organizations and journalists. In 
addition, we conducted in-depth research in national and local newspaper archives. Finally, we 
conducted numerous interviews with government officials, civil society organizations, and 
Islamists on the ground in Indonesia between 2005 and 2014. If we were unable to obtain an 
actual hard- or soft-copy of the entire shari’a regulation, we did not include it in our list. This 
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way, we established a list of 422 shari’a regulations, making it the most comprehensive data set 
on shari’a regulations in Indonesia currently available.8 
For some local regulations it was not immediately clear whether they classify as shari’a 
regulations. For instance, should regulations against the consumption of alcohol be considered a 
shari’a regulation or a public health regulation? It is important to establish a clear classification 
for local regulations because morality laws may diffuse differently than health laws.9   
To address this issue, we looked at the content of the regulation and the justifications 
made therein as to why the regulation was deemed necessary by the local government that had 
adopted the regulation. For instance, if a district government prohibited the consumption of 
alcohol on religious grounds we considered it a shari’a regulation and included it in our dataset.  
The data collection process also showed that there are different types of shari’a 
regulations. We found regulations on “public order and social problems” such as alcohol 
consumption, gambling, and prostitution. There are also regulations on “religious skills and 
obligations” including Qur’an reading skills, prayer requirements or regulations that outline what 
constitute “proper” Islamic beliefs. Finally, there are regulations that resemble not much more 
than “religious symbolism.” These include dress codes for men and women (Salim, 2007, p. 
126). Bush argued that the first kind of shari’a regulation should be categorized as “morality 
issues” since they “reflect the moral teachings of most religions and the majority of Indonesian 
society”, while the second and third category are directly linked to the Qur’an and are therefore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Previous studies have grossly underreported the number of shari’a regulations, estimating that there are only 
between 78 and 169 such regulations in Indonesia. See Bush 2008, 174–191 and Buehler 2013, 63-82 respectively. 
9 For a more extensive discussion on this issue, see Pisani and Buehler, unpublished manuscript. 
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best categorized as regulations pertaining to “Islamic teachings” (Bush, 2008, p. 177). We 
followed Bush’s categories in our paper. 
The diffusion of shari’a regulations across time and space  
In order to show that the Islamization of politics through the adoption of shari’a 
regulations is a process that may vary across time and space, we first examined when and where 
shari’a regulations were adopted.  Our data shows that  shari’a regulations have spread 
relatively steadily between 1998 and 2013. If anything, their number has increased after 2005.10 
This refutes claims made in previous studies mentioned above that the Islamization of politics in 
Indonesia is a transitional phenomenon confined to the years immediately following the collapse 
of the military regime in 1998. 
The diffusion of shari’a regulations is also cyclical. 68 percent (287/422) of all shari’a 
regulations were adopted by local government heads during their first term in office, while only 
30 percent (125/422) were adopted during local government head’s second term in office.11 
Indonesian law limits the time politicians can occupy governor or district head posts to two 
terms, each lasting five years. Arguably, local politicians lose interest in adopting such 
regulations when they no longer have to stand for re-elections.12 
With regard to the spatial dimension of the diffusion process, 62 percent of all shari’a 
regulations adopted between 1998 and 2013 cluster in six provinces. These shari’a clusters are 
West Java (85), West Sumatra (55), South Kalimantan (38), East Java (32), South Sulawesi (26), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This may have to to with the fact that direct elections for local government heads were introduced in 2005. For a 
detailed analysis, see Buehler 2016. 
11 Seven shari’a regulations were adopted by caretakers that occupy office in between two elected district heads. 
Furthermore, in the case of three shari’a regulations, we could not establish whether they had been adopted in the 
first or second term as they did not include any date. 
12 For a more in-depth analysis of how the adoption of shari’a regulations relates to election cycles, see Pisani and 
Buehler, unpublished manuscript. 
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and Aceh (25).13 It is also in these provinces where the first shari’a regulations were adopted 
after the political opening in 1998. In other words, the number of shari’a regulations adopted 
outside these shari’a clusters was fairly low in the years immediately following the collapse of 
the New Order regime. Between 2004 and 2012 the number of shari’a regulations adopted 
outside these shari’a clusters increased.14 This indicates that shari’a regulations have indeed 
diffused across the country in a gradual process. However, the majority of shari’a regulations 
continue to be adopted in the six shari’a clusters as shown in Table 1.  Overall, the diffusion of 
shari’a regulations remains relatively confined. Most shari’a regulations diffuse within the 
provinces in which they have been adopted first. In other words, they have not spiraled out 
across the archipelago in great numbers from the six shari’a clusters.     
Table 1 The diffusion of shari’a regulations across Indonesia, 1998-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For an analysis of the political dynamics in these shari’a clusters, see Buehler, “Subnational Islamization,” 63-82. 
14 There were no shari’a regulations adopted outside the shari’a clusters in 2013. It is not yet possible to say 
whether this is the start of a new trend. 
Year Shari’a 
Clusters 
Percentage Non-Shari’a 
Clusters 
Percentage Total 
1999 3 75% 1 25% 4 
2000 11 85% 2 15% 13 
2001 23 82% 5 18% 28 
2002 16 53% 14 47% 30 
2003 26 70% 11 30% 37 
2004 18 56% 14 44% 32 
2005 28 74% 10 26% 38 
2006 20 54% 17 46% 37 
2007 22 55% 18 45% 40 
2008 21 54% 18 46% 39 
2009 28 55% 23 45% 51 
2010 18 78% 5 22% 23 
2011 20 53% 18 47% 38 
2012 6 55% 5 45% 11 
2013 1 100% 0 0% 1 
Total 261 n/a 161 n/a 422 
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To gain a better understanding for how these shari’a regulations diffused, we then 
compared their content. A brief examination of the 422 shari’a regulations provides a first 
impression of the spread of shari’a regulations across the country between 1998 and 2013. The 
content of 60 percent (252/422) of all shari’a regulations adopted between 1998 and 2013 is 
about “Islamic teachings”, while the remaining 40 percent (170/ 422) are concerned with 
“morality issues.”  
Furthermore, of the 252 shari’a regulations concerned with Islamic teachings, 24 
percent (62/ 252) regulate the collection of religious alms (zakat), 23 percent (59/ 252) are 
concernded with Islamic knowledge and skills, 15 percent (39/ 252) are regulating Islamic 
micro-finance, 11 percent (27/ 252) establish rules to foster “proper faith” and prohibit “Islamic 
sects”15, while 10 percent (25/ 252) regulations are establishing dress codes for Muslim. 17 
percent (40/252) of this type of shari’a regulation deal with other issues pertaining to Islamic 
teachings.  
A breakdown of shari’a regulations concerned with morality issues shows that 51 
percent (85/168) prohibit the consumption of alcohol, 29 percent (49/ 168) prohibit prostitution, 
and 2 percent (4/ 168) prohibit gambling. The remaining 18 percent (30/ 168) of shari’a 
regulations on “morality issues” are relatively unspecific as they merely talk about encouraging 
“social order” or prohibiting “sins”.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Most of these regulations outlaw the practices of Ahmadiyah, a heterodox Islamic group. 
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Overall, these descriptive statistics on the content of shari’a regulations show that shari’a 
regulations concerned with Islamic teachings have diffused relatively more easily than shari’a 
regulations concerned with morality issues. 
Based on this first finding about the distribution of shari’a regulations, we decided to 
compare the content of the two groups of shari’a regulations concerned with Islamic teachings 
that have been most widely adopted across jurisdictions, namely regulations on the collection of 
religious alms (zakat) and shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills. Such a focus was 
most likely to yield insights into the diffusion patterns of shari’a regulations. 
For logistical and financial reasons, we had to confine our content analysis to the 
shari’a regulations in the districts of two provinces. We focused on West Java and West Sumatra 
province because the majority of shari’a regulations on zakat collection and Islamic knowledge 
and skills were adopted in these two provinces. Concretely, of the 62 shari’a regulations on 
zakat adopted between 1998 and 2013, 18 percent (11/ 62) were adopted in West Java and 13 
percent (8/ 62) in West Sumatra, totalling more than 30 percent of all zakat regulations adopted 
nationwide. Likewise, 58 percent (34/ 59) of all shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and 
skills concentrate in these two provinces. 18 such regulations were adopted in West Java and 16 
such regulations were adopted in West Sumatra. The distribution within these provinces is also 
considerable. In West Java and West Sumatra, zakat regulations exist in 42.3 percent and 41.1 
percent of all jurisdictions respectively, while shari’a regulations concerned with Islamic 
knowledge and skills exist in 30.5 percent of all districts in West Java and 42 percent of all 
districts in West Sumatra. More comprehensive data on the content of these shari’a regulations 
is available in online appendices accompanying this article.16 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The appendices are available at www.michaelbuehler.asia 
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The diffusion of shari’a regulations on zakat.  
In West Java and West Sumatra, 19 zakat regulations were adopted between 1998 and 
2013. We successfully obtained 10 such regulations in West Java and 7 regulations in West 
Sumatra. Our content analysis revealed that the overall focus of these regulations on the 
collection of religious alms is similar across most jurisdictions in the two provinces. Most 
shari’a regulations contain rules on the collection of religious alms and a list of what items are 
taxable under zakat law. Finally, almost all these zakat regulations contain instructions for 
establishing Government Zakat Collection Bodies (BAZ, Badan Amil Zakat) and Private Zakat 
Collection Bodies (LAZ, Lembaga Amil Zakat).  
 Furthermore, our analysis showed that the content of the shari’a regulations on zakat in 
most jurisdictions in the two provinces was copied directly from the National Law No. 38/ 1999 
on Zakat Management.17  
However, our comparison also showed that many jurisdictions enriched paragraphs from 
the Law No. 38/ 1999. For instance, local shari’a regulations not only expanded the rules and 
regulations for the formation of BAZ and LAZ stipulated in Law No. 38/1999 but added new 
items on which zakat payments were required. Local jurisdictions also often changed the 
percentage figures for religious taxes. Some shari’a regulations also introduced new procedures 
for the collection of religious taxes.  
 Concretely, at least 17 of the 19 shari’a regulations introduced more stringent rules for 
the operation of local zakat collection agencies. They also ruled that local governments need to 
financially support the daily operations of the zakat collection agencies. There are no such 
stipulations in the Law No. 38/ 1999.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Law No. 38/ 1999 on Zakat Management was the first law adopted in post-1998 Indonesia that had an explicit 
religious focus. 
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Most shari’a regulations on the collection of religious alms also introduced new 
oversight mechanisms for the operations of local zakat collection bodies. Law No. 38/ 1999 
mereley states that these collection bodies need to submit an accountability report to the 
parliament in their jurisdiction. Many local shari’a regulations revised this stipulation to the 
extent that accountability reports need to be submitted to parliaments and local executive 
governments.  
 Finally, many local shari’a regulations also introduced new sanctions for violating the 
rules and stipulations outlined in the regulations on the collection of zakat. For instance, most 
local shari’a regulations introduced significant higher prison sentences and monetary fines for 
transgressors compared to the national law.  
 In short, shari’a regulations on the collection of zakat became more comprehensive and 
more stringent during the diffusion process from the national to the subnational level.    
However, the content of shari’a regulations on the collection of religious alms has not 
only diffused in a vertical fashion from the national to the local level. Our content analysis 
showed that the Islamization of politics also occurred along horizontal lines. Concretely, 
jurisdictions in both West Java and West Sumatra “borrowed” paragraphs from one another, as 
shown in online appendix 1. 
Finally, the enriched content of these local shari’a regulations subsequently spread to the 
national level. When the national government replaced Law No. 38/ 1999 with Law No. 23/ 2011 
on Zakat Management, it introduced many of the more stringent provisions that had been 
introduced by local shari’a regulations on zakat adopted in previous years. For example, Article 
30 of Law No. 23/ 2011 now states that the government is responsible for operational funding of 
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the state-sponsored zakat body, now called BAZNAS.18 This was first mentioned in local shari’a 
regulations on zakat. The revised national law also introduced accountability mechanisms that 
drew on local shari’a regulations. For instance, Article 7, Paragraph 3 of Law No. 23/2011 
requires the BAZNAS to deliver an annual report to both the President and the national 
parliament. Again, this has first been mentioned in local shari’a regulations on the collection of 
zakat. Sanctions for violating the new national law on zakat management have also been 
modeled after local shari’a regulations on zakat, which became harsher as these regulations 
diffused horizontally as mentioned before. This shows that the vertical diffusion of zakat 
regulations also occurred bottom-up. 
To summarize, the diffusion of zakat regulations in Indonesia occurred both vertically 
and horizontally. Our comparison of the content of shari’a regulations on zakat showed that 
these regulations diffused vertically first. Subnational jurisdictions adopted such shari’a 
regulations only after Law No. 38/ 1999 on Zakat Management had been adopted. Subsequently, 
the content of these regulations diffused horizontally. Many jurisdictions copied the exact 
wording from the district that had adopted shari’a regulations on the collection of zakat first. In 
the process of this horizontal diffusion, the content of these shari’a regulations on zakat often 
changed. Many zakat regulations that were adopted later on were more comprehensive and also 
more stringent than the zakat regulations that had been adopted in the years immediately after the 
fall of Suharto. 
The diffusion of shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills 
Next we compared the content of shari’a regulations concerned with Islamic knowledge 
and skills. Again, West Java and West Sumatra have the highest number of such shari’a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 BAZNAS stands for Badan Amil Zakat Nasional and replaced BAZ, which stood for Badan Amil Zakat. 
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regulations. We obtained 14 of these regulations in West Java and 11 such regulations in West 
Sumatra. The shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills in both provinces emphasized 
the need to increase religious instruction for pupils and students after 1998.  
However, there were considerable differences between the two provinces with regard to 
the means through which such additional religious instruction should be provided. In West Java, 
89 percent (16/18) of all shari’a regulations concerned with Islamic knowledge and skills require 
pupils to attend private boarding schools, madrasah diniyah, for additional religious instruction. 
In West Sumatra, in contrast, 88 percent (14/16) of all shari’a regulations on Islamic teachings 
require students to improve their Islamic knowledge and skills through courses on Qur’an 
literacy that are offered as part of the official school curriculum. In other words, West Java’s 
jurisdictions almost exclusively require the provision of additional religious instruction through 
extra-curricular means while in West Sumatra, almost all shari’a regulations concerned with 
Islamic knowledge and skills stipulate that additional religious instruction ought to occur as part 
of the official curriculum.    
Furthermore, a comparison of the content of shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and 
skills both within and across these two provinces showed that such shari’a regulations diffused 
mainly horizontally, that is within administrative layers. The first shari’a regulation on providing 
extracurricular religious instruction through madrasah diniyah was adopted in Indramayu district 
in 2003. Many districts in the province subsequently adopted similar shari’a regulations and 
“borrowed” from this first shari’a regulation. Likewise, the shari’a regulations on improving 
Islamic knowledge and skills through increasing the hours of Qur’an reading at official schools 
spread horizontally across West Sumatra. The first such shari’a regulation was adopted in Solok 
district in 2001 from where it spread to other districts across the province in subsequent years. 
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During this diffusion process, districts liberally borrowed paragraphs from the initial shari’a 
regulation in Solok district as shown in online appendix 2.  
To summarize, there was no vertical diffusion in the case of shari’a regulations on Islamic 
teachings unlike during the diffusion of shari’a regulations on the collection of zakat. In other 
words, there was no national law that triggered the diffusion of this type of shari’a regulation at 
the subnational level. Shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills also did not travel 
upward from the local level to inspire national laws.19  In short, the diffusion of shari’a 
regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills is highly confined by a specific local context. This 
was also shown by the fact that in West Java, almost all shari’a regulations pertaining to Islamic 
teachings were regulating religious instruction through madrasah diniyah. In contrast, in West 
Sumatra, shari’a regulations to improve pupils’Islamic knowledge and skills aimed at doing so 
through additional Qur’an reading classes within the official school system.  
Factors shaping the diffusion of shari’a regulations 
What accounts for these patterns in the diffusion of shari’a regulations on zakat and Islamic 
knowledge and skills? Existing scholarship on the diffusion of morality policies suggested 
geographic proximity, the institutional framework, relations between administrative layers, 
economic conditions as well as local cultures as factors potentially shaping the diffusion of 
morality policies.   
 In Indonesia, geographical proximity does not seem to drive the diffusion of shari’a 
regulations, at least not beyond the provincial level. Most of the shari’a regulations adopted 
since 1998 cluster in six provinces as mentioned before. None of these provinces share 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Only the provincial government in West Sumatra adopted one shari’a regulation on Islamic knowledge and skills 
in 2007. 
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boundaries with one another. Shari’a regulations also show considerably difficulties to spill over 
into provinces that do share borders with these shari’a clusters, as shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Number of shari’a regulations enacted in Indonesia at the provincial or district 
level between 1999 and 2012, by province. 
 
Source: Pisani and Buehler, unpublished manuscript. 
The fact that most districts in the six shari’a clusters have adopted at least one shari’a 
regulation between 1998 and 2013 suggests that geographical proximity plays a role in the 
diffusion of shari’a regulations within these clusters. However, this needs to be qualified. Most 
jurisdictions in each these shari’a clusters adopted a different “mix” of shari’a regulations 
compared to neighboring districts. A few districts in the two provinces have adopted no shari’a 
regulations at all. Finally, we are aware of only one occasion during which local politicians were 
pondering the adoption of a shari’a regulation because the existence of such a regulation in a 
neighboring district. In Pare Pare City in South Sulawesi province, the head of the local branch 
of the Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Law (KPSSI, Komite Persiapan 
Penegakan Syariat Islam), a conservative pressure group lobbying for a state based on Islamic 
law, argued in a hearing with the local parliament that Pare Pare City needed to outlaw the 
consumption of alcohol because, otherwise, hordes of “drinkers” (peminum) from a nearby 
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district that had outlawed alcohol consumption would flock to Pare Pare City to drink liquor 
(Tribun Timur 2009).20 
 Arguments that institutional conditions determine the diffusion of morality policies also 
struggle to explain the shari’a-ization of politics in Indonesia after 1998. In the USA, for 
instance, where most of the literature on the diffusion of morality policies comes from, federal 
structures provide local jurisdictions with considerable authority over the design of their local 
electoral and political institutions. Consequently, there are great institutional differences between 
reformed and non-reformed local jurisdictions. In contrast, Indonesia is a decentralized unitary 
state where the national government defines the boundaries of institutional changes at the local 
level. Hence, there are no institutional differences between Indonesian districts. The argument 
that morality policies diffuse more easily among non-reformed districts, that is jurisdictions with 
electoral institutions that facilitate the influence of groups situated in society, compared to 
reformed districts where the institutional environment confines the possibilities for societal 
groups to influence politics, does therefore not apply to Indonesia. In short, as there are no 
institutional differences between districts, institutional factors cannot account for why shari’a 
policies diffuse among certain districts but not others.  
In fact, in most Indonesian districts the institutional framework is underutilized from a 
shari’a policy perspective. Shari’a regulations have diffused to only a small number of districts 
despite the fact that the institutional framework would allow all jurisdictions in Indonesia to 
adopt such regulations. This provides further evidence that theories which emphasize the causal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Arguably, geographical proximity does not facilitate the diffusion of shari’a regulations because they are rarely 
implemented. Hence, politicians do not have to be concerned about potential spill-over effects even if neighboring 
districts adopt shari’a regulations against prostitution or the consumption of alcohol. Subsequent research will need 
to examine such hypotheses through surveys and in-depth process tracing.  
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primacy of institutions in the diffusion of morality policies cannot explain the Indonesian case 
well. 
 Arguments that have been made in the literature on the diffusion of morality policies 
about how intergovernmental relations shape the diffusion of morality policies also do not travel 
easily to the Indonesian context. In the USA, for instance, morality policies seem to spread 
predominantely to local jurisdictions that are situated in states whose legal context is conducive 
to the causes pushed by morality policies.  
Such intergovernmental relations may explain some of the diffusion processes in 
Indonesia. The diffusion process of shari’a regulations on zakat was clearly triggered by the 
adoption of Law No. 38/ 1999 on Zakat Management.21 However, the legal framework of higher 
administrative layers in which districts are embedded is, again, underutilized by most local 
jurisdictions Indonesia. In other words, many districts could adopt shari’a regulations according 
to the provincial legal framework, yet have not adopted any shari’a regulations.  Concretely, 
only 12 percent (61/510) of all districts in Indonesia have adopted shari’a regulations on the 
collection of zakat, despite the fact that the national law would allow all jurisdictions in 
Indonesia to adopt such regulations. If intergovernmental relations would play a decisive role in 
the diffusion of shari’a regulations in the sense that it enables local jurisdictions to adopt such 
regulations, we would expect to see a diffusion of shari’a regulations to a much higher number 
of districts.  
Economic considerations also do not seem to play much of a role in the diffusion of 
shari’a regulations. Theoretically, many shari’a regulations provide local governments with 
opportunities to generate additional income, ranging from tax revenues to the extortion of money 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Likewise, shari’a regulations prohibiting the religious practices of the Ahmadiyah only emerged after a national 
Joint Decree on Ahmadiyah was issued in 2008. 
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from karaoke bars and nightclubs (Buehler, 2008). Poor jurisdictions would therefore be more 
likely to adopt shari’a regulations, according to our argument.  
Yet, the economic conditions of jurisdictions that have adopted shari’a regulations differ 
considerably. For instance, West Java is relatively wealthy while West Sumatra is relatively 
poor. Yet both West Java and West Sumatra are provinces where shari’a regulations have come 
to cluster. Again, it is not the case that only jurisdictions in financial distress adopt shari’a 
regulations while jurisdictions that do well economically do not adopt such regulations. 
Economic conditions therefore struggle too to explain the diffusion of shari’a regulations in the 
archipelago.  
Arguably, differences in local cultures explain best the diffusion patterns we identified. 
Most shari’a regulations were adopted in six provinces and mainly diffused within these six 
clusters. With the exception of East Java22, in all other provinces local Islamist movements 
calling for a state based on Islamic law have existed for several decades (Buehler, 2013). 
Suppressed for most of the authoritarian New Order period, recent research showed that the 
democratization after 1998 has revived these local Islamist groups and allowed them to push for 
the adoption of Islamic law once more (Buehler 2013). Locally rooted and parochial, these 
groups nevertheless frequently refer to other shari’a clusters when making claims for the 
necessity of shari’a regulations in their respective jurisdiction. For instance, the KPPSI, a 
conservative pressure group in South Sulawesi mentioned before, explicitly referred to the legal 
framework in Aceh province when it demanded in an open letter that local governments adopt 
Islamic law (KPPSI, 2005, 5). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For an account of why shari’a regulations have spread to East Java, see Endang Turmudi 2004, 38-60.  
26/38 
 
In fact, patterns in the diffusion of shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills 
identified above suggest that even within these clusters diffusion is shaped by local conditions. In 
West Java, shari’a regulations on Islamic teachings stipulated that additional religious 
instruction had to occur through madrasah diniyah. Such stipulations were absent in West 
Sumatra. There, local governments issued shari’a regulations that require students to improve 
their Islamic knowledge and skills by taking additional Qur’an reading classes offered as part of 
the official school curriculum. We believe that local cultural differences account for these 
differences.  
The Dutch colonial administration tried to incorporate local education networks into the 
standard school curriculum through various rules and stipulations. However, Islamic schools 
located outside the colonial education system continued to grow in West Java and maintained 
their unique Islamic traditions (Steenbrink, 1974).  
These madrasah diniyah, prevalent across West Java, are informal afternoon schools. 
Unlike a pesantren that is usually owned and controlled by a charismatic religious cleric (kyai), 
madrasah diniyah are managed by a committee of Islamic teachers recruited from village 
communities. Since these schools do not have paying students unlike pesantren, their financial 
situation depends mostly on voluntary donations (El-Saha, 2008). Across the province, there are 
also still many boarding schools that are rooted in the Guru Kula system. In this system, a 
religious teacher instructes a few students only, most of whom who live in his home. He 
therefore depends on other sources of income to make a living. Additional sources of income 
often come from teaching at madrasah diniyah. In short, underfunded religious boarding schools 
situated outside the official education system form the backbone of the educational infrastructure 
in West Java.  
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Arguably, these local conditions have shaped the shari’a regulations on Islamic 
knowledge and skills that spread across West Java after 1998. All districts in West Java that 
adopted shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills channel students towards the 
madrasah diniyah and promise financial support to the clerics administering these schools.   
In West Sumatra, in contrast, Islamic schools have long tended to mix general education 
with religious study (El-Saha, 2008, pp. 57-61.) Emblematic of this school type is Madrasah 
Adabiyah, which was founded in West Sumatra’s Padang Panjang by Abdullah Ahmad in 1907. 
In addition to instruction in Arabic and Islamic religious instruction, the school also offered 
courses in mathematics, as well as reading and writing training in the Latin alphabet (Steenbrink, 
1974, pp. 38-9). It was easier for the Dutch to incorporate these kind of Islamic schools in West 
Sumatra into the official colonial education system. Consequently, private boarding schools 
situated outside official educational structures figure less prominently in West Sumatra’s 
political landscape today. Arguably, this explains why shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge 
and skills adopted in West Sumatra after 1998 emphasize the importance of additional Qu’ran 
reading instruction within the official school curriculum. None of the shari’a regulations on 
Islamic knowledge and skills in West Sumatra refer to Islamic boarding schools situated outside 
the official education system. 
In short, differences in the nature of the local Islamic education system in West Java and 
West Sumatra have facilitated the diffusion of certain types of shari’a regulations on Islamic 
teachings within these provinces but also prevented the diffusion of shari’a regulations on 
Islamic knowledge and skills to other provinces or an upward diffusion to the national level.   
Summary of findings and avenues for future research 
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Our research suggests that examining the diffusion of shari’a regulations across time and 
space can contribute to a better understanding of the Islamization of politics in the context of 
democratization. We identified several patterns in the diffusion of shari’a regulations in 
Indonesia:  
One, the diffusion of shari’a regulations in Indonesia after 1998 was steady but cyclical. 
This refutes claims that the spread of shari’a regulations in Indonesia was a transitional 
phenomenon. Two, with regard to the diffusion across space, we showed that certain shari’a 
regulations diffused both vertically and horizontally. Other shari’a regulations diffused mainly 
horizontally. The fact that not all shari’a regulations spread in the same fashion suggests that the 
content of shari’a regulations shapes the diffusion process. Certain issues seem to have relevance 
in certain localities only and therefore hardly spread beyond certain localities as our comparison 
of shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills showed. Shari’a regulations with a more 
technical content, such as the regulations on zakat, diffused more easily both across and within 
government layers. In other words, the content of shari’a regulations can be an independent 
variable that shapes the outcome of the diffusion process as it influences which constituencies 
and organizations become involved in debates about specific shari’a regulations. Future research 
will have to examine how exactly the content of shari’a regulations shapes the Islamization of 
politics and identify the reasons for why certain shari’a regulations spread in a top-down manner 
while others seem to be almost exclusively local affairs. 
Three, our research showed that the content of shari’a regulations can also be a 
dependent variable. In other words, rather than the content shaping the diffusion process, the 
diffusion process also shaped the content of shari’a regulations. For instance, many shari’a 
regulations on the collection of zakat we tracked became more comprehensive and more 
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stringent over time. This shows, again, that the temporal dimension in the diffusion of shari’a 
regulations deserves more attention because the timing seems to have an effect on the content of 
shari’a regulations. In fact, existing research on the diffusion of morality policies suggests that 
there is something “different about leaders, middle adopters and laggards, and perhaps about 
how policies spread across these temporally segmented sets of governments” (Graham et al. 
2013, p. 26). In the USA too, for instance, late adopters usually issue more comprehensive 
morality policies (Karch, 2007, 70).  
Laggards may adopt more stringent shari’a regulations for various reasons. For example, 
looking at the adoption of policies and laws of early adopters, laggards are able to examine the 
public debate about the acceptability of certain policies and adjust their regulations accordingly. 
Future research needs to identify more specifically the reasons for why the content of the same 
type of shari’a regulation differs between early adopters and laggards.  
 Three, our research suggests that the adoption of shari’a regulations across space and 
time is contingent on local culture. Geographical proximity, institutional, intergovernmental, and 
economic explanations for the diffusion of morality policies seem to be, at best, necessary but 
not sufficient explanations for the diffusion of shari’a regulations in Indonesia. Instead, most 
shari’a regulations spread mainly within provinces that have a long history of Islamist activists 
pushing for a state based on Islamic law. In addition, our comparison of the content of shari’a 
regulations showed that different kinds of shari’a regulations diffuse in different ways. Shari’a 
regulations concerned with Islamic knowledge and skills were different in West Java and in West 
Sumatra. In other words, local conditions also contained the diffusion of shari’a regulations on 
Islamic knowledge and skills beyond the respective province.  
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 Future research will have to examine more in-depth what makes local cultures conducive 
to the spread of shari’a regulations and other morality policies. For instance, the important role 
historically entrenched local Islamist groups play in the diffusion of shari’a regulations in 
Indonesia raises the question whether such groups simply aggregate the interests and aspirations 
of the local population or whether these groups are somewhat more isolated within local 
society.23 
In other words, while conservative Islamist pressure groups have a well established 
presence in all clusters to which shari’a regulations mainly diffused, little is known about 
whether such groups reflect popular opinion.24 Future research needs to examine the relationship 
between such groups and the general public and how this relationship shapes the diffusion of 
Islamic law.   
In this context, it is also important to examine in future research whether local culture 
shapes the diffusion of the adoption of shari’a regulations in different ways than the diffusion of 
the implementation of shari’a regulations. The following anecdote shows the importance of 
differentiating between the two. After Indonesian media reported that the implementation of 
shari’a regulation on the collection of zakat were mainly targeting local bureaucrats25, there were 
several jurisdictions in which local bureaucrats began to push back after their local governments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Recent research suggests that many of these shari’a regulations are adopted despite a lack of popular demand. In 
fact, the adoption of certain shari’a regulations diminished incumbents’chances to get re-elected. See Pisani and 
Buehler, unpublished manuscript. Why this is the case needs to be addressed in future research. In may be that the 
majority of citizens do not dare to speak out against such shari’a regulations as they fear to be seen as “bad 
Muslim.” They may therefore openly support such regulations while in private (or in secret during the electoral 
process) may reject such shari’a regulations. On “preference falsification”and its political consequences, see Kuran 
1997. 
24 Mooney showed for the USA that the homogeneity of an electorate influences the probability of morality policies 
being adopted or rejected. See Mooney2000: 179. 
25 The weak Indonesian state does not have the capacity to collect taxes from most of its citizens. Only around 10 
percent of Indonesians pay taxes. Consequently, most local governments have resorted to targeting bureaucrats. 
They are an easy target for tax collection because their salaries are controlled by the state. Governments have 
resorted to simply cutting bureaucrats’ salaries by the amount they are supposed to pay according to the respective 
shari’a regulation on zakat.   
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began to actually implement shari’a regulations on the collection of zakat. In Bulukumba and 
East Lombok district, for instance, thousands of schoolteachers protested against salary cuts 
based on local shari’a regulations on the collection of zakat (Wikileaks, 2009; Suaedy, 2007). In 
both jurisdictions, the district heads had to promise not to collect zakat from local bureaucrats to 
appease the situation. In Pangkep district, also in South Sulawesi province, the district head 
referred to the demonstrations in Bulukumba a few years later when he announced plans to adopt 
a shari’a regulation on zakat. He reiterated on several occasions in the local press that the 
salaries of bureacrats would not be cut.  Bulukumba, Pangkep and East Lombok district, like 
many other jurisdictions in Indonesia, now have shari’a regulations on the books that are not 
enforced due to public resistance. This not only shows the merely symbolic character of many of 
these shari’a regulations but also that different dynamics may be at play in the diffusion of the 
adoption of shari’a regulations and the diffusion of the implementation of shari’a regulations in 
Islamic countries in the context of democratization. Future research will have to examine why 
the adoption of shari’a regulations spreads relatively easily compared to the implementation of 
such regulations. In addition, research on the Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-
majority countries needs to examine whether the implementation of shari’a regulations in one 
jurisdiction facilitates or prevents the implementation in another jurisdiction. 
Finally, future research on the diffusion of Islamic law will have to go beyond a focus on 
the content of such shari’a regulations and examine the actors involved in the diffusion process. 
In light of our findings about the importance of local cultural contexts, such a focus on actors 
ought not to follow rational-choice theory but understand actors as political players who face 
“cognitive and normative pressures to conform to cultural rules, norms and expectations” (Miller 
and Banaszak-Holl, 2005, p. 191).  
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Our findings corroborate existing research on the Islamization of politics in Indonesia 
that showed how local Islamist groups in a small number of provinces are putting pressure on 
local governments to adopt shari’a regulations (Buehler, 2013; 2016).26 However, these groups 
are too fragmented, parochial and locally defined to establish structures across jurisdictions. It is 
therefore unlikely that they shape the interdependence between districts when it comes to 
policymaking. Hence, more information is needed on whether there are interest associations 
whose apparatus spans across jurisdictions and administrative layers and what role they play in 
the actual diffusion of Islamic law (Balla 2001).27  
A potentially important organization in Indonesia in this respect is the Indonesian Ulema 
Council (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia). The MUI was established during the authoritarian 
New Order period in 1975 by President Suharto to foster closer relations with the emerging 
Islamic community (ummah). The democratization of Indonesian politics after 1998 has allowed 
the MUI not only to redefine its role – it now officially serves the ummah rather than the 
government – but also to become more directly involved in politics. In past years, the MUI has 
become a crucial player in local discourses on morality and religious orthodoxy, and has played a 
crucial role in formulating national policies such as the law against pornography or the ban on 
the Ahmadiyah community, a heterodox Islamic group (Ichwan, 2013). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Of course, local elites are not only at the receiving end but may actively approach Islamist groups and networks. 
How Islamic educational networks are used by elites for political ends in Indonesia, see Elisa Brewis “Education, 
Islam and Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” unpublished MA Thesis, Department of Southeast Asian Studies, 
SOAS University of London. 
27 In South Sulawesi, the KPPSI as well networks of local Muhammadiyah branches organized knowledge exchange 
seminars and workshops on shari’a regulations. Often, local MUI branches are waiting for the national headquarters 
to approve their decisions, raising the question about national level political actors in the diffusion of shari’a 
regulations. On the MUI as a crucial actor in the diffusion process, see Ruddy 2005: 27; Suaedy 2007: 205; 
Alamsyah, forthcoming: 12-32. 
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Despite MUI’s repositioning, it remains a semi-governmental organization with a 
centralized bureaucracy, branches in almost every jurisdiction across Indonesia and considerable 
financial strength, mainly due to state funding (Hasyim, 2013, pp. 42-55).  
In recent years, the MUI has used its institutional capacity to organize numerous 
workshops, study tours and knowledge exchange seminars. It has also published “best practice” 
guides and organized speaker tours for district heads that had pioneered the adoption of shari’a 
regulations in their respective jurisdiction.28 Arguably, it is through channels of organizations 
such as the MUI that shari’a regulations have spread between jurisdictions where local 
politicians were under pressure from local Islamist groups and therefore receptive to the 
Islamization of politics practiced in other jurisdictions (Hasyim, 2013, p. 63). In the context of 
most Islamist groups being locally confined, the vertical networks of national organizations such 
as the MUI and the role they play in the top-down dissemination of shari’a laws adopted at the 
national level need to be studied further.29 Future research in Indonesia and other democratizing 
Muslim-majority countries needs to examine more in-depth the role of such epistemic 
communities in linking jurisdictions across which shari’a regulations have diffused. Studying the 
role of academics, lobbying groups but also diasporas and the mass media seems particularly 
important.30 
Arguably, the MUI also plays a more important role in the Islamization of politics in 
Indonesia than Islamist parties. Indonesia’s Islamist parties are poorly consolidated and lack 
grassroots networks on the ground. Their agenda has also become more moderate as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For instance, the MUI organized a talk for a politician from Sukabumi district to brief his colleagues in Cianjur 
district on the shari’a economy in Sukabumi (Ruddy 2005: 85-8).  
29 For some initial findings, see Hasyim 2013: 156.  On the importance of the vertical nature of “go-between” 
organizations for the diffusion of policies, see Graham et al. 2013: 20-1. Certain shari’a regulations exist only at the 
provincial level, as is the case in Gorontalo. However, this is a rare exception and needs further investigation. 
30 Graham et. al. 2013: 12-4.  
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consequence of electoral pressures (Buehler 2012). This is also the case in other democratizing 
Muslim-majority countries. Not all Islamist parties have grown out of social movements but are 
cadre parties. Many Islamist parties therefore do not command over broad networks on the 
ground. Likewise, many Islamist parties abandon their shari’a agenda as they become enmeshed 
in the compromise-laden business of government. In other words, as most Islamist parties are 
subject to moderation after becoming more formally included in politics such are parties are 
arguably unlikely to be the main driver behind the diffusion of Islamic laws a few years into the 
democratization process. In light of these findings, future research needs to look more critically 
at whether Islamist parties really play such an central role in the Islamization of politics in 
democratizing Muslim-majority countries. 
Conclusion 
The political influence of Islamist activists is likely to grow in the context of 
democratization in Muslim-majority countries. However, the Islamization of politics in new 
Muslim-majority democracies is poorly understood. Most important, the Islamization of politics 
is rarely explicitly examined as a process with a spatial and temporal dimension. 
 In this paper, we began isolating conditions that potentially facilitate or contain the 
Islamization of politics. We did so by comparing shari’a regulations that have been adopted in 
different jurisdictions after Indonesia became a democracy in 1998. Our content-tracing showed 
that the diffusion of these shari’a regulations is a highly dynamic process that unfolds unevenly 
across time and space. We argued that the variance behind the diffusion of shari’a regulations is 
contingent on local factors and that competing explanations such as economic deprivation or 
institutional conditions do not explain the patterns we isolated equally well.  
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 In addition to showing a need to analyze the content of Islamic laws across time and 
space in other democratizing Muslim-majority countries to better understand the diffusion of 
such regulations, our paper also called for a focus on the actors involved in the diffusion of 
Islamic laws. We believe that the MUI, a semi-government organization, is one of the main 
drivers of the Islamization of politics in Indonesia. This suggests that future studies need to 
consider a broader range of potential explanations for why the democratization of Muslim-
majority countries often triggers an Islamization of politics. The current scholarly debate is 
dominated by a focus on Islamist parties and how they shape national politics. However, our 
research not only showed that there can be considerable subnational variance in the Islamization 
of politics but also that local conditions, especially a history of Islamist activism, may play an 
important role in shaping the diffusion of Islamic laws. Finally, semi-governmental organizations 
that command over a relatively well-financed bureaucratic apparatus that stretches across 
jurisdictions may play a more important role in the Islamization of politics compared to Islamist 
parties. The Indonesian case can therefore sheds light on other Muslim-majority countries 
emerging from an authoritarian past and in which Islamic sentiment may not only be highly 
fragmented and poorly organized but also weakly institutionalized and lacking in resources.  
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